









ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF BANK MERGERS: AN APPLICATION 
TO THE PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM*
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abstract
Most studies assessing the impact of bank mergers analyze the differential impact 
of these processes on a number of variables that characterize the banking system. 
However, this approach has important limitations, ignoring endogenous changes in 
market structure that might occur after the merger. This article analyzes the impact on 
credit markets of a number of bank mergers in the Portuguese banking system using this 
methodology usually employed in the literature, as well as an alternative methodology 
based on the estimation of a structural model, which allows for the derivation of a 
counterfactual scenario. In this framework it becomes possible to evaluate, using this 
structural model, what would have happened if the mergers had not occurred. We ﬁ  nd 
that these mergers have contributed to a decrease in loan interest rates larger than 
what could have been anticipated. The ﬂ  ow of credit to non ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms was larger 
than what was suggested by the combination of the pre-merger equilibrium with the 
post-merger environment. In contrast, the ﬂ  ow of loans to households was lower than 
expected, even though the loans granted to this sector have recorded a signiﬁ  cant 
growth during the period analysed.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the last decades there was a global consolidation trend in the banking system (Boot, 1999, Berger 
et al., 2004, Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). In Portugal, the increase in bank concentration was specially 
marked in the year 2000. In that year, several mergers and acquisitions took place, involving four out of 
the seven largest banking groups operating at that time (including one large foreign bank). The magnitude 
of these mergers and acquisitions led to profound changes in the structure of the Portuguese banking 
system, with implications on the equilibrium in credit markets.
In this article, we analyze ex-post the impact of this merger wave in the Portuguese banking system, 
using two different methodologies. One of the most common approaches in the literature is to estimate 
the differential impact of mergers. This approach relies essentially on the comparison of several relevant 
variables before and after the mergers. However, this methodology suffers from serious limitations, as it 
ignores endogenous changes in market structure in the post-merger equilibrium in the banking system. 
In a recent paper, Barros et al. (2010) propose a new methodology to overcome these methodological 
limitations. By relying on a structural model of the credit market, this new methodology allows for a 
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counterfactual analysis of mergers, combining the pre-merger equilibrium setting with characteristics 
of the post-merger environment, while accounting for endogenously propagated changes in market 
structure. Using this procedure, it becomes possible to estimate loan ﬂ  ows and interest rates that would 
be observed if the pre-merger equilibrium was not altered, i.e., if mergers had not occurred. In this 
article we apply the methodology presented in Barros et al. (2010) to the merger wave that occurred in 
the Portuguese banking system in 2000. Our impact assessment focuses on loan ﬂ  ows and loan interest 
rates, distinguishing the impact on households and on non-ﬁ  nancial corporations.
We ﬁ  nd important differences between the impact of bank mergers on loans granted to households 
and to ﬁ  rms, as we observe that mergers seem to have increased the amount of credit granted to ﬁ  rms 
and decreased the availability of loans to households, when compared to a counterfactual scenario. All 
in all, households may have faced some constraints in access to credit after the merger, even though 
loans to households recorded robust growth rates during this period. On the contrary, loans granted 
to ﬁ  rms seem to have surpassed by a large extent what could have been expected before the mergers. 
Moreover, the merger wave induced a stronger decrease in interest rates than what could have been 
foreseen, thus beneﬁ  ting customers. 
This article proceeds as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂ  y review the related literature on the assessment of 
the impact of bank mergers and in section 3 we describe the datasets used for the empirical analysis. In 
section 4 we present an analysis of changes in the structure of the Portuguese and European banking 
system. In section 5 we brieﬂ  y describe the counterfactual methodology proposed by Barros et al. (2010) 
and in section 6 we present our main results on the impact of the merger wave on Portuguese credit 
markets. Section 7 summarizes our main ﬁ  ndings.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a large literature on the gains banks obtain from merging. For instance, Focarelli et al. (2002) 
ﬁ  nd that mergers increase return on equity, but they also lead to a rise in staff costs. In turn, they ﬁ  nd 
that acquisitions generate a long-term reduction in lending, mainly for small ﬁ  rms, and a permanent 
decrease in bad quality loans, which positively affects long-run proﬁ  tability. Focusing on European 
mergers, Altunbas and Marqués (2008) ﬁ  nd that improvements in banks’ performance subsequent to 
mergers are more signiﬁ  cant if there are strategic similarities between the merging banks. Mergers and 
acquisitions also generate important changes in market structure and competition, as discussed in Berger 
et al. (2004), Cerasi et al. (2010), Craig and Santos (1997) or in Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004). 
Some authors also ﬁ  nd that mergers may enhance cost reduction and improve resource allocation. 
For instance, Carbó Valverde and Humphrey (2004) argue that mergers should reduce costs faced by 
banks, raise their return on assets and improve general resource utilization. They also ﬁ  nd that a merger 
is more likely to be successful if it is large (scale effect) and also if it is initiated by a bank that has been 
previously involved in a merger (learning effect). Moreover, mergers may generate informational gains, 
which improve banks’ screening abilities and customer discrimination (see, for instance, Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006, or Panetta et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, bank mergers may have important implications for ﬁ  nancial stability, as they lead to 
changes in market power, concentration and competition. Many authors consider that there is trade-off 
between competition and ﬁ  nancial stability, which may warrant the intervention of banking supervisors 
and competition authorities in some cases. Chan et al. (1986) show that more competition in banking 
markets implies an erosion of the surplus banks can obtain by screening borrowers’ quality. These 
reduced incentives for adequate screening lead necessarily to an overall deterioration of the quality of 
banks’ loan portfolios. Further theoretical evidence on the trade-off between market power and bank 
risk is presented by Hellman et al. (2000) and Repullo (2004). The main argument of this line of research 









taking. Empirically, Beck et al. (2006) ﬁ  nd that banking crisis are less likely when the banking system 
is more concentrated. Craig and Santos (1997) also show that consolidation in the banking industry in 
the US has allowed for increased risk diversiﬁ  cation, thus decreasing individual bank risk. However, the 
authors note that this decrease in the risk of the banking system may be partly offset by an increase 
of the moral hazard associated with the too-big-to-fail problem. Indeed, if banks believe that they are 
likely to be bailed out in case of distress, they may have incentives to take on excessive risk. Jiménez et 
al. (2007) also obtain empirical evidence that supports this trade-off perspective. These authors ﬁ  nd a 
negative relationship between Spanish banks’ market power in the loan market and banks’ risk-taking, 
measured as the ratio of non-performing commercial loans. 
However, some authors have disputed this traditional “competition-fragility” view by presenting an 
alternative “competition-stability” theory, as discussed by Berger et al. (2009). For instance, Boyd and 
De Nicoló (2005) investigate the theoretical relationship between bank competition and risk-taking and 
ﬁ  nd several limitations in the competition-fragility models. According to these authors, these models 
fail to identify important risk-incentive mechanisms that encourage banks to take on more risk when 
markets become more concentrated. More speciﬁ  cally, when there is less competition banks may extract 
more rents from customers, charging higher interest rates, which in turn imply also more risk-taking 
by borrowers and higher bankruptcy rates. Allen and Gale (2004), Carletti and Hartmann (2002) and 
Carletti et al. (2007) also present theoretical arguments to challenge the traditional competition-fragility 
view, showing that bank competition may sometimes promote ﬁ  nancial stability. In addition, Uhde and 
Heimeshoff (2009) provide empirical evidence on the negative effect of bank concentration on banks’ 
ﬁ  nancial soundness, using data for European banks between 1997 and 2005. 
All in all, the interactions between bank competition and ﬁ  nancial stability are complex and multi-
faceted, as discussed by Allen and Gale (2004). In a recent paper, Berger et al. (2009) show empirically 
that the two views described above are not necessarily incompatible. Their results, based on bank data 
for 23 developed economies, suggest that banks with more market power are generally less exposed to 
overall risk (which is consistent with the competition-fragility view), but they also ﬁ  nd that market power 
increases the risk of the loan portfolio (thus also supporting in part the competition-stability perspective).
It is also important to assess the impact of bank mergers on customers. Several authors conclude that 
bank mergers may negatively affect borrowers, most notably if they are small and medium size ﬁ  rms, 
dependent on bank funding and with a limited number of bank relationships. For instance, Bonaccorsi 
di Patti and Gobbi (2007) ﬁ  nd that, for a sample of Italian ﬁ  rms, bank mergers have a negative effect on 
credit, particularly if the lending relationship comes to an end after the merger, even though this effect 
should persist only during the three years after the merger. However, this negative effect is not sufﬁ  cient 
to generate a negative impact on ﬁ  rms’ investment or cash-ﬂ  ow sensitivity. Other authors ﬁ  nd mixed 
evidence regarding the impact of bank mergers. Also using a sample of Italian ﬁ  rms, Sapienza (2002) 
concludes that in-market mergers beneﬁ  t borrowers if these mergers involve banks with limited market 
power. However, as the market share of the acquired bank increases, the efﬁ  ciency gains are offset by 
an increase in market power, which may imply a decrease in loan supply, especially to small borrowers. 
In another study, Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) analyze the results of a survey on US ﬁ  rms and ﬁ  nd that 
bank mergers do not affect loan supply or interest rates, even though there is some deterioration in 
non-price loan terms, such as fees for speciﬁ  c services. Degryse et al. (2010) ﬁ  nd that the impact of a 
bank merger is more negative for smaller borrowers and for single relationship borrowers. Moreover, 
target bank borrowers should be more harmed by the merger than borrowers of the acquiring bank. 
Finally, Karceski, et al. (2005) ﬁ  nd that mergers may have impacts on borrowers beyond credit availability 
and interest rates. These authors show that mergers may in fact have important consequences on ﬁ  rm 
value, observing that borrowers of the acquiring banks usually beneﬁ  t from the mergers, whereas ﬁ  rms 































































There is less work done on the impact of bank mergers on depositors. There is some empirical evidence 
for Italian ﬁ  rms which suggests that bank mergers may have positive consequences for depositors in 
the long-run, even though there may be some negative effects in the short run (Focarelli and Panetta, 
2003). However, Craig and Dinger (2009), using US data, obtain a different result, given that they do 
not observe any positive long-term effect of mergers on deposit interest rates. Their results are consistent 
with previous work done by Prager and Hannan (1998).
3. DATA
The empirical analysis of merger impact in the Portuguese banking system relies on three different data 
sources. 
First, most of the information comes from the Monetary and Financial Statistics of Banco de Portugal. 
Using bank-level data, we are able to use unique interest rate and credit data, which allows distinguishing 
between the household and the corporate sectors. The Monetary and Financial Statistics are a monthly 
mandatory survey involving all ﬁ  nancial institutions operating in the country and including information 
on end-of-period stocks and ﬂ  ows of credit granted to households and to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations.1 
Data on interest rates are based on the ﬂ  ows of new credit granted. 
The second dataset includes information on the branches’ location. The data are collected by the Pruden-
tial Supervision Department of Banco de Portugal. Whenever a bank establishes a branch, it is required 
to report this event to the supervisor, as well as when there is a branch change of address, closing or 
any other major change.
Finally, the third database includes regional characteristics, more precisely quarterly demographic char-
acteristics by district in Portugal, collected by Statistics Portugal.
The full dataset consists of quarterly data from the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1995 to the third quarter of 2002 and 
each observation corresponds to a bank in each quarter.
4. MERGERS IN THE PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM
During the last two decades, consolidation in the banking system was an important trend globally 
(Boot, 1999, Berger et al., 2004, Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). Banks became larger by acquiring and/
or merging with other banks, both domestically and internationally. In the European Union, this trend 
was supported in part by the increasing ﬁ  nancial and economic integration among Member States. In 
particular, the enlargement of the European Union to Central and Eastern European countries offered 
some banking groups attractive opportunities for the expansion of their activities, even if some barriers 
to further consolidation in Europe may still exist, as discussed by Berger et al. (2001).
The consolidation trend in the European banking system is illustrated in charts 1 and 2. Both the share 
of the 5 largest credit institutions and the Herﬁ  ndahl index for total assets of credit institutions show 
an increasing trend during the last decade.2 The number of branches per 1000 inhabitants decreased 
signiﬁ  cantly between 1997 and 2005, though some reversion in this trend was observed in the more 
recent years (Chart 3). 
The total number of deals related to mergers and acquisitions of credit institutions in the European Union 
was remarkably large immediately after the creation of the euro area (Chart 4), having decreased since 
1  For further details on the Monetary and Financial Statistics, please see http://www.bportugal.pt/en-US/Estatisti-
cas/Dominios%20Estatisticos/Pages/EstatisticasMonetariaseFinanceiras.aspx.










2000 (ECB, 2007).3 Most of these deals involved domestic credit institutions (Chart 5), thus contributing 
to explain the increase in concentration indicators observed during this period (Charts 1 and 2). 
The number of deals was relatively large in many European countries during this period, as illustrated 
in chart 6. The absolute number of deals was very large in Germany, Italy, France, Spain and the UK. 
However, when evaluated as a percentage of GDP, the number of mergers and acquisition was more 
remarkable in Luxembourg and, to a lesser extent, in Italy, Greece and Portugal. 
3  Despite the decrease in the number of deals during the last decade, the value of the transactions increased 
between 2006 and 2008, after having decreased signiﬁ  cantly between 2001 and 2005 (ECB, 2010).
Chart 1 Chart 2
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Sources: ECB (Structural analysis of the EU banking sector, November 2002, November 2003; EU Banking structures October 2005, 
September 2010) and authors’ calculations.
Note: Non-consolidated data.
Chart 3 Chart 4
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In fact, the mergers in the Portuguese banking system during this period led to important changes in 
the structure of the banking market. The mergers and acquisitions involving Portuguese banks were 
specially concentrated in 2000. In this year, several of the largest banking groups were involved in concen-
tration operations. In March 2000, the group Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor (BPSM), which included the 
banks BPSM, Banco Totta e Sotto Mayor Inv (BTSM Inv), Banco Totta e Açores (BTA) and Crédito Predial 
Português (CPP), was extinguished. The bank BPSM was bought by Banco Comercial Português (BCP). 
At the same time, BTSM Inv was acquired by Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) and CPP was acquired by 
BTA. Later in the year, the Spanish banking group Santander acquired BTA. These operations directly 
involved four out of the seven major ﬁ  nancial groups in that period, thus generating profound changes 
in the structure of the Portuguese banking market. The magnitude of these changes is clearly illustrated 
in charts 1 and 2, where a very signiﬁ  cant increase in concentration in the Portuguese banking system 
is observed. Despite this increase, chart 7 shows that the Portuguese banking system is still not highly 
concentrated compared to other European countries.
Chart 5
PERCENTAGE OF DOMESTIC MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
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Sources: ECB (Structural analysis of the EU banking sector, November 2003; EU Banking structures October 2005) and authors’ 
calculations.
Chart 6































The available evidence suggests that the signiﬁ  cant changes that occurred in 2000 may have had impor-
tant consequences in the credit market, namely on credit granted, interest rates charged and on the 
strategic effects among the ﬁ  nancial players.
In table 1 we present some descriptive statistics to characterize the Portuguese banking system during 
the period analyzed (1995-2002).4
Overall, there are 71 banks in the dataset that are in operation for at least one quarter during the sample 
period. Banks are grouped in 8 major ﬁ  nancial groups: we consider the seven most important ﬁ  nancial 
groups that include 26 banks and one additional group including the remaining banks in the sample5. 
Four of these banking groups were directly involved in the 2000 merger wave.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample for the stock of credit, ﬂ  ows and other variables 
for three different groups of banks: i) the four large banking groups involved in the merger wave, ii) 
the three large banking groups not involved in the mergers, and iii) the remaining banks that were not 
involved in the merger wave. The average credit market share of a bank belonging to the group of 
banks engaged in mergers is 3.4 percent, while the large banks that do not belong to this group have 
on average 6.7 percent of the total stock of credit. In turn, the smaller banks not involved in mergers 
have only, on average, 0.6 percent of the credit market. This last evidence highlights the importance of 
treating these banks separately and, hence, they will be excluded from regression analysis.
4  A more detailed analysis of the Portuguese banking system during this period may be found in Antão et al. 
(2009).
5  As shown by Park and Pennacchi (2009), bank mergers affect differently large and small banks, hence justifying 
analyzing them separately.
Chart 7













Sources:  ECB (Structural analysis of the EU banking sector, November 2003) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The colour codes refer to the four quartiles of the distributions of the share of the 5 largest ﬁ  nancial institutions (left) and of 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The average interest rate on the total credit ﬂ  ow charged by the banks involved in mergers is 11.1 percent 
(9.2 percent for the other large banks and 8.5 per cent for the smaller banks). The household market 
experiences higher interest rates (13.2, 10.4 and 10.2 percent for the groups of banks under analysis) 
than the corporate sector (9.9, 9.3 and 7.9 percent, respectively).6
These statistics refer to the entire sample period. We will analyze how the merger wave affected credit 
ﬂ  ows and interest rates, both for households and for ﬁ  rms.
5. A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
In a recent paper, Barros et al. (2010) present a new methodology to assess the impact of mergers in 
banking. This methodology is based on a structural model of the credit market. Using this structural 
model, it is possible to derive a counterfactual analysis of bank mergers, by combining the pre-merger 
equilibrium setting with characteristics of the post-merger environment, while simultaneously accounting 
for endogenously propagated changes in market structure. This methodology allows to estimate loan 
ﬂ  ows and interest rates that would be observed if the pre-merger equilibrium was not altered, i.e., 
if mergers had not occurred. It becomes possible to obtain estimates of the impact of bank mergers 
accounting for the effects associated with endogenous changes in conduct and market structure after 
mergers have taken place. These effects are usually ignored in the assessment of merger impact and 
can lead to a signiﬁ  cant bias in the results obtained. Moreover, this methodology allows disentangling 
the effect of changes in the macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial environment from endogenous changes in 
market structure resulting from the mergers.
In this section, we brieﬂ  y present the anatomy of the structural model of equilibrium in the banking 
system (further details may be found in Barros et al., 2010).
We consider that the loan demand function in credit markets is:
01 2 12 3 4 5 ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln it i t t it it it it it Lr Z B B r P o p L C aaa a f f f f f - =++ + + + + + + (1)
Lit is the total loan demand directed at each bank i during a quarter t, measured by loan ﬂ  ows. This 
demand function encompasses two main components: economy-wide variables (all those denoted with 
a subscript t) and bank-level determinants (those with the subscript it). α0 is a constant and αi is a bank-
speciﬁ  c ﬁ  xed effect. The set of economy-wide variables includes the aggregate average interest rate on 
new loans granted in Portugal in each quarter, rt, and a measure of overall macroeconomic conditions, 
Zt (quarterly GDP). In turn, the bank-speciﬁ  c variables include the number of branches of a bank and of 
its rivals (Bit and B-it respectively), the bank-speciﬁ  c interest rate on loans, rit, and two measures of local 
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6  Most of the banks in the sample operate in both the household and the corporate credit markets, even though 
some small banks display null credit ﬂ  ows in one of these segments in some quarters. All banks considered grant 
credit to households and only two small banks never grant credit to ﬁ  rms during the entire sample period. It 
should be noted that the household sector comprises both loans for consumption and other purposes and for 
house purchase. During the sample period, the estimated interest rate for the former was around 4 p.p. higher 































































where the sum is performed for all the districts in the country. POPit is a measure of the importance 
of each local market (district) to bank i in period t: the proportion of branches each bank has in local 
market k is weighted by the population in that market. Thus, banks that have a higher proportion of 
branches in more heavily populated areas will have, ceteris paribus, a higher demand for their loans. 
The variable LCit is the sum of the squares of the district local market competition values and attempts 
to capture the intensity of competition. The basic element is the share of (branch) competition faced 
by bank i in market k. This is given by the share of rival banks in the total number of branches in local 
market k, weighted by the importance of local market k, branch-wise, to bank i. This index can accom-
modate the differences involved in having branches in markets where other banks have no branches 
relative to crowded markets.
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In this equation, j represents all rival banks and cit are funding costs. Bank ﬁ  xed-effects are represented 
by βi. The strategic effects between bank i and its j rivals are captured by the group of parameters λij. If 
λij = 1, there is collusion, whereas if λij = 0 banks maximize proﬁ  ts independently.
The equilibrium in credit markets is given by:
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(3)
In order to simplify the empirical estimation, we have reduced the number of strategic effects λij and 
considered the interaction of bank i with its main rival, which is deﬁ  ned to be the ﬁ  nancial institution 
with the lowest interest rate during the quarter, Rminit.7
This system of equations is empirically estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, 
which allows for cross-equations correlation of the residuals.
6. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE 2000 MERGER WAVE IN THE 
PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM
6.1. What changed after the mergers?
In this section we analyze the impact of the 2000 merger wave on credit ﬂ  ows and interest rates. 
Furthermore, we also consider how the merger wave affected local branch competition and coordina-
tion moves in the banking industry.
7  We have tried different strategic effects and the results do not change signiﬁ  cantly. For instance, we have 
considered (i) deﬁ  ning the main rival as the bank that has granted more credit during the quarter; (ii) the bank 
with the closest loan ﬂ  ow in each quarter; (iii) the interaction of the ﬁ  ve main rivals; or (iv) the average of the 









In table 2, we begin by simply comparing credit ﬂ  ows, interest rates and concentration indicators before 
and after the merger wave. After the mergers, loan ﬂ  ows were higher than in the pre-merger period, both 
for households and ﬁ  rms. It is worth noting that this trend was stronger for the banks directly involved in 
the mergers, given that the remaining banks actually recorded some decrease in loan ﬂ  ows, especially in 
what concerns loans to households. Moreover, average loan ﬂ  ows are only statistically different before 
and after the mergers for those banks that were directly involved in this process. Comparing interest 
rates in the pre- and post- merger periods, we observe that there was a widespread decrease in interest 
rates after the mergers occurred, partly reﬂ  ecting lower banks’ funding costs arising from lower money 
market interest rates during this period, as well as from access to more varied funding sources due to 
the participation in the euro area. However, the data show that banks directly involved in the mergers 
decreased interest rates more aggressively than the other banks, narrowing their interest rate margins in 
order to attract more customers and, possibly, also reﬂ  ecting efﬁ  ciency and informational gains arising 
from the merger process (see, for example, Sapienza, 2002, Hauswald and Marquez, 2006, and Panetta 
et al., 2009).
However, this simple analysis is necessarily incomplete, as many factors may be driving the differences in 
credit and interest rates in these two periods. In this respect, a more robust identiﬁ  cation strategy is to use 
the structural model of the credit market outlined in the previous section to study the differential impact 
of the merger wave. More precisely, we can estimate the following modiﬁ  ed empirical version of (3):
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Table 2
ANALYSIS CREDIT FLOWS AND INTEREST RATES BEFORE AND AFTER THE MERGERS
All banks Banks directly involved in 
mergers




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Credit ﬂ  ows (ln)
Total 5.76 5.81 0.05 5.50 5.76 0.26 6.16 5.88 -0.28
Households 4.10 4.77 0.67 *** 3.74 5.07 1.33 *** 4.60 4.37 -0.23
Firms 5.59 6.01 0.42 * 5.39 6.14 0.74 * 5.84 5.89 0.05
Interest rates
Total 11.46 8.20 -3.26 *** 12.18 8.92 -3.26 *** 10.39 7.30 -3.09 ***
Households 13.31 9.37 -3.95 *** 14.49 10.46 -4.03 *** 11.68 7.96 -3.72 ***
Firms 11.03 6.83 -4.20 *** 11.30 6.58 -4.72 *** 10.68 7.07 -3.62 ***
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The pre-merger period comprehends the 1995-1999 period, whereas the post-merger period goes from 2000 to 2002. The 
group of ﬁ  nancial institutions directly involved in the merger includes institutions belonging to ﬁ  nancial groups that have acquired 
or sold a ﬁ  nancial institution to a different ﬁ  nancial group in 2000. The interest rates refer to the new loans granted in each quarter. 
Asterisks refer to mean comparison tests between the pre- and post-merger variables. * signiﬁ  cant at 10%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 5%; 































































In this model, the coefﬁ  cient α01 captures eventual changes in the level of the credit ﬂ  ow after the merger 
wave and Φ51 considers the difference in the impact of the local branch competition on the quarterly 
credit ﬂ  ow following the 2000 merger with respect to the impact during the pre-merger period. The 
variable AFTER is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when an observation refers to a quarter in 
2000 or after. The results for the differential impact of the merger wave are presented in table 3.
In this table, columns (1)-(2) present the analysis for the total credit ﬂ  ow (household plus corporate credit, 
i.e., non-ﬁ  nancial private sector) and columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) present the results for the household 
and corporate sectors, respectively. It should be noted that, in this setting, we are able to differentiate 
banking output into household and ﬁ  rm loans without making any assumptions regarding their comple-
mentarity or substitutability, given that these are two different and independent markets. This implies 
null cross-elasticities of demand between these markets, given that, by deﬁ  nition, customers cannot 
switch between them. Thus, specifying linear demand functions should not inﬂ  ict problems that would 
exist in markets where these cross-elasticities vary in response to different strategies.8 As mentioned 
before, the system of equations (4) is estimated using a seemingly unrelated (SUR) model, which allows 
for cross-equations correlation of the residuals and takes into account the constraint included in the 
structural model. All regressions are estimated using banks’ ﬁ  xed effects and robust standard errors.
Looking at the results for the aggregated credit ﬂ  ows, in columns (1) and (2), we observe that the 
total number of branches is positively and signiﬁ  cantly related to the logarithm of total credit granted, 
indicating that local branching arrangements are an important factor in liquidity provision.9 In addi-
tion, the interest rate charged by the bank is negatively related to the total credit granted, as would be 
expected.10 Furthermore, the interest rate charged by each bank, rit, is strongly and positively related 
to banks’ funding costs, cit (which is a measure of weighted funding costs, taking into account deposit 
and interbank funding).
Although columns (1) and (2) reveal consistent estimates of the determinants of the credit and interest 
rates charged by the bank, the analysis for the aggregate credit ﬂ  ows smoothes important idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the determinants of the household and corporate sectors credit markets, which are 
analyzed in columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), respectively. The distinction across these institutional sectors 
highlights important differences in these markets, thus justifying a disaggregate speciﬁ  cation rather than 
treating the credit market as homogeneous.
We observe that the banks’ own number of branches positively inﬂ  uences credit granted, both to households 
and to ﬁ  rms (the estimated coefﬁ  cients are 1.05 and 1.17, respectively). In turn, the number of branches 
of the remaining banks is not signiﬁ  cantly correlated with credit granted to households, as illustrated 
in column (3), while it has a negative and signiﬁ  cant impact on credit supplied to the corporate sector.
The ﬁ  rst row of the estimated coefﬁ  cients in table 3 shows the results for the variable AFTER. For 
the whole non-ﬁ  nancial private sector (column (1)), credit ﬂ  ows increased after the merger wave and 
interest rates decreased signiﬁ  cantly. However, there are important differences in the merger impact on 
the household and corporate sectors. In fact, the negative coefﬁ  cient for the dummy AFTER  in column 
(3) reveals that the quarterly credit ﬂ  ow decreased after the mergers for the household sector, despite 
the decrease in interest rates (column (4)). This suggests that there were important changes in market 
8  Berg and Kim (1998) empirically document such separability in the Norwegian market and present a discussion 
on cross-market interactions when banks produce multiple outputs.
9  In a recent paper, Corvoisier and Gropp (2009) argue that the widespread use of web-based banking platforms 
should have decreased sunk costs and increased contestability in retail banking, as establishing branches beca-
me less important. Nevertheless, the authors ﬁ  nd that even though this hypothesis may be true for time and 
saving deposits, it does not hold for small business loans, where establishing a branching network with local 
connections is still important.
10 In the table, we omit the t-stats for this coefﬁ  cient in columns (1), (3) and (5), as this coefﬁ  cient is determined 










ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF THE MERGER WAVE
Fluxos de crédito totais Households Sociedades não ﬁ  nanceiras
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
System of equations System of equations System of equations
ln(credit) rit ln(credit) rit ln(credit) rit
AFTER 0.343 ** -1.628 *** -0.471 *** -2.003 *** 0.971 *** -1.939 ***
(2.09) -(8.07) -(3.01) -(8.22) (4.48) -(8.40)
ln (number of branches) 0.974 *** 1.052 *** 1.168 **
(3.07) (2.89) (2.50)
ln (number of branches other 
banks) -0.745 0.774 -3.337 ***
-(1.05) (1.13) -(3.56)
ln(rt) -0.133 0.343 -0.545
-(0.38) (0.81) -(1.04)
ln(rit) -0.310 *** -1.064 *** -1.268 ***
---
GDP 0.041 0.130 *** -0.045
(1.37) (4.01) -(0.91)
POP 0.130 * -0.023 -0.213 *
(1.65) -(0.21) -(1.87)
LC 6.066 *** 6.559 ** 17.389 ***
(2.63) (2.31) (5.46)
LC*AFTER -1.021 *** 0.462 -2.289 ***
-(4.02) (1.47) -(5.21)
cit 1.046 *** 1.036 *** 1.068 ***
(22.71) (19.30) (20.68)
Rmin -15.475 -1.147 0.622 ***
-(1.34) -(1.01) (4.47)
Rmin*AFTER 4.953 -6.171 -0.491 ***
(0.12) -(0.42) -(3.49)
constant 4.598 6.102 *** -9.142 7.247 *** 32.409 *** 6.202 ***
(0.68) (9.12) -(1.36) (9.55) (3.53) (8.64)
Lambda (λ) -80.6 -0.2 -0.3
H0 = λ = 0  [Prob> χ2] 0.71 0.53 0.31
H0 = λ = 1  [Prob> χ2]  0.71 0.00 0.00
Lambda*AFTER (λafter) 25.8 -1.2 0.2
H0 = λ = 0  [Prob> χ2] 0.91 0.71 0.32
H0 = λ = 1  [Prob> χ2]  0.91 0.49 0.00
Observations 562 562 507 507 496 496
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: All regressions include banks’ ﬁ  xed effects and robust standard errors. Robust t statistics are presented in parentheses. 
* signiﬁ  cant at 10%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 5%; *** signﬁ  cant at 1%. The estimations are performed for quarterly data during the 1995-
2002 period. The estimation considers the constraint included in the system using a seemingly unrelated (SUR) model. AFTER is a 
binary variable that takes the value one if the observation is on or after 2000. The interest rates refer to the new loans granted in 
each quarter. LC is a measure of local competition and POP is a measure of the importance of each market to bank i in period t. Cit 
is a measure of weighted funding costs, taking into account deposits and interbank funding. Rmin is a variable that measures the 
strategic interaction between banks, being deﬁ  ned as Rmin = (1/nbanks) * Ljt / Lit * (rjt - cjt), where Ljt and rjt are, respectively, the 
loan ﬂ  ow and the interest rates of each banks’ rival, deﬁ  ned as that with the lowest interest rate in that quarter, in each market seg-
ment. The t statistics for the coefﬁ  cient associated with ln(rit) in columns (1), (3) and (5) are omitted, as this coefﬁ  cient is determined 
by a constraint in the model. The lower number of observations in the regressions for households and ﬁ  rms is due to the fact that 
some small banks show null credit ﬂ  ows in one of these market segments in some quarters (two small banks never grant credit to 
ﬁ  rms during the entire sample period). λ reﬂ  ects the effect of the rival banks on the proﬁ  t maximization function of each bank and 































































equilibrium after the mergers, given that a pure shift along the demand curve would imply a positive 
effect on credit due to the decrease in interest rates.
During the sample period, separate bank-level data on new loans and interest rates granted for house 
purchase and for consumption are not available. However, given the potentially relevant strategic differ-
ences in these two segments of the credit market, we conducted an additional estimation exercise to 
obtain approximate results for these two segments.11 Using these proxies, we ﬁ  nd that the decrease of 
loan ﬂ  ows and interest rates in the household sector after the merger was possibly much more pronounced 
in loans for consumption and other purposes.
In turn, for the corporate sector, credit granted increased after the merger and the interest rate charged 
decreased, as shown in columns (5) and (6). Post-merger equilibrium loan rates decrease when the merger 
induces large cost advantages relative to the increase in banks’ market power, as shown by Carletti et 
al. (2007). Our results are consistent with Fonseca and Normann (2008), who argue that even though a 
merger involving the largest ﬁ  rm in a market creates a more asymmetric market structure, asymmetric 
markets exhibit lower prices than symmetric markets with the same number of ﬁ  rms.12
Looking at the effect on local branch competition, LCit, we ﬁ  nd that the merger impact was more signiﬁ  -
cant for the corporate sector. In this credit market, we ﬁ  nd that the merger leads to a decrease in the 
impact of local competition on the credit ﬂ  ow. Hence, the positive impact of local bank competition on 
credit granted to ﬁ  rms becomes slightly smaller (though still positive and large) after the merger wave.
The evidence on strategic behaviour, measured by the coordination parameter λ, suggests that there is no 
collusion between banks. The statistical tests on these parameters show that we can reject the hypothesis 
of collusion in the household credit market for the whole period, though that conclusion does not hold 
for the post-merger period. In turn, in the corporate loan market we always reject the existence of full 
coordination moves between banks, even though λ increased somewhat after the merger wave. These 
results are consistent with previous evidence obtained by Berg and Kim (1998), who argue that the 
mobility of customers in the corporate market is stronger than in other markets, thus generating more 
competitive behaviours by banks. More recently, Degryse et al. (2010) show that ﬁ  rms may beneﬁ  t from 
switching banks after mergers occur, which is related to banks’ competitive strategies.
6.2. Limitations of the differential analysis and the proposal of a new 
methodology
The previous analysis computes a differential effect of speciﬁ  c variables and assumes that all other 
interactions remain constant. This is one of the most common approaches in the literature to estimate 
the impact of bank mergers. However, this methodology does not fully take into account the structural 
changes that should have occurred in credit markets after the merger wave. Given the magnitude and 
extension of the mergers, the way banks (and their customers) interact should change substantially after 
large mergers. In Barros et al. (2010) a new methodology is proposed to overcome the limitations of 
the differential analysis. Using the structural model brieﬂ  y described in section 5, it becomes possible 
to estimate a counterfactual scenario for the post-merger period, thus going beyond the simple (and 
11 To do that, we use information on the share of loan ﬂ  ows granted for these two purposes to obtain proxies 
for the new credit granted (however, whereas in the rest of the article loan ﬂ  ows refer to new credit granted, 
here we estimate this share using the difference in the amount of loans outstanding at t and t-1; hence, these 
loan ﬂ  ows reﬂ  ect new credit granted deducted from amortizations of outstanding loans). Moreover, for interest 
rates we used the aggregate difference between rates on outstanding loans in these two segments of loans to 
households to obtain bank-level proxies.
12 In order to conﬁ  rm the validity and strength of these differential impacts, we tested for the existence of a struc-
tural break after the merger wave, using a Chow test. In all the tests performed we reject the null hypothesis of 









insufﬁ  cient) comparison of variables before and after mergers occur, which is usually performed for the 
assessment of merger impact.
The estimation of counterfactuals to assess the impacts of a merger may be considered an important 
policy tool. For instance, Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) emphasize that the evaluation of a merger from a 
policy perspective should not be based solely on a static comparative analysis, but should also consider 
dynamic effects and alternative merger scenarios. Berry and Pakes (1993) also argue that static models 
of equilibrium do not take into account the long-run reactions of merging and non-merging ﬁ  rms, 
thus generating misleading results. In an application to the airline industry, Peters (2006) demonstrates 
the importance of designing a counterfactual analysis to evaluate the impact of mergers, but is silent 
regarding the possibility of collusion or strategic interactions between ﬁ  rms. Berger et al. (1998) ﬁ  nd 
empirical evidence that supports the view that the dynamic effects of mergers may generate results 
different from those obtained using static analysis. The authors identify a decrease in lending to small 
business after a merger, even though this static effect is largely offset by dynamic effects associated 
with changes in the focus of the merging banks or with the reaction of other banks. Nevertheless, 
these authors do not consider local changes induced by mergers, neither do they compare the impact 
on different institutional sectors.
In a few words, the counterfactual methodology proposed in Barros et al. (2010) considers that a whole 
new scenario is created after the merger wave that inﬂ  uences all variables in the credit market. Under 
this scenario, the evaluation of the differences in strategic effects requires the comparison between the 
results for the post-merger period and the ones obtained from the estimation of the pre-merger equi-
librium using the post-merger data (counterfactual). The main advantage is that it becomes possible to 
analyze the merger impact using the post-merger environment.
To construct the counterfactual for the empirical estimation we ﬁ  rst estimate the model (3) for the 
1995-1999 pre-merger period. We then use the pre-merger coefﬁ  cient estimates of this model for the 
2000-2002 data on exogenous variables to obtain the value of the estimated post-merger credit ﬂ  ows 
and interest rates charged by the bank. This means that these two estimated variables are the credit 
and interest rates in the post-merger period assuming the impact of the market environment, strategic 
effects and local market competition in the pre-merger period. Hence, we use the structural model of 
equilibrium in credit markets to analyze the impact of changes in market factors due to the merger wave. 
Using this methodology, we compare the interest rate and credit ﬂ  ows in the post-merger equilibrium 
setup with the value of these variables under a counterfactual equilibrium. This counterfactual equilibrium 
is estimated using the after-merger exogenous environment under the pre-merger market structure.
6.3. Main counterfactual results
In table 4 we present the main results of the counterfactual analysis of the 2000 merger wave in the 
Portuguese banking system. The ﬁ  rst two columns show the observed credit ﬂ  ows before and after the 
merger wave (as in table 2), and column (3) displays the counterfactual estimates. As described above, 
these estimates result from predicting these two variables for the post-merger period, by taking into 
account the pre-merger equilibrium and the post-merger environment. Hence, variables such as money 
market interest rates, GDP or number of branches are considered in the post-merger period to obtain 
these estimates. We also present the results of mean comparison tests between the counterfactual 
estimates and the post-merger observed variables.
By comparing credit ﬂ  ows observed after the merger with the estimated post-merger ﬂ  ows, we conclude 
that aggregate loan ﬂ  ows would have increased even more if mergers would not have occurred, albeit the 
difference between the counterfactual and the actually observed loan ﬂ  ows is not statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
However, our results also show that there are important differences between the evolution of loans to 































































in striking contrast with the acceleration actually observed during this period. On the other hand, the 
model predicts that household credit could be signiﬁ  cantly larger than what was actually observed. 
To better understand these results, we used the proxies mentioned in section 6.1 to run the counterfactual 
exercise separately for estimates of loans and interest rates for house purchase and for consumption 
and other purposes. Though this analysis has several limitations, we ﬁ  nd that the counterfactual results 
obtained for the household sector in table 4 should be mainly associated with the evolution of loans for 
consumption and other purposes, as the loan ﬂ  ows for house purchase in the counterfactual scenario 
are not statistically very different from those observed in the post-merger period. Indeed, the estimates 
performed suggest that loan ﬂ  ows in housing loans have increased slightly more after the mergers than 
what could have been predicted in the counterfactual.
The counterfactual estimates also suggest that interest rates would still decrease if no mergers had occurred. 
However, comparing these estimates to the post-merger observed values, we conclude that the observed 
decrease in interest rates was, by any means, larger than that predicted by the pre-merger equilibrium, 
even taking into account the developments in money market interest rates in the post-merger period. 
All in all, this strong decrease in interest rates, which largely surpassed the counterfactual estimates in 
all the credit market segments, should be associated with an increase in credit granted. However, in 
table 4 we observe that this is not the case for loans to households, where loan ﬂ  ows observed after 
the mergers were actually lower than what was predicted by the counterfactual (though above those 
observed in the pre-merger period). As discussed before, this result was possibly mainly due to the 
evolution of loans for consumption and other purposes, as the ﬂ  ow of loans granted for house purchase 
was larger in reality than what was predicted by the counterfactual. Given that a pure shift along the 
demand curve would simply imply a positive effect on credit as a result of the decrease in interest rates, 
this outcome for household loans suggests that there were important changes in market equilibrium after 
the mergers, specially in loans for consumption: even though banks decreased interest rates aggressively 
in this segment, the loan demand was possibly not as strong as expected. Indeed, between end-1999 
and early 2003 the annual growth rates of loans to households for consumption and other purposes 
decreased signiﬁ  cantly, from around 30% to virtually null growth rates. This evolution occurred against 
a background of contraction in the consumption of durable goods.
In Barros et al. (2010) the counterfactual analysis is extended to also consider the possibility of ignoring 
changes in the branch network after the mergers, given that these should have had effects on the struc-
ture of the branch network and, most notably, on local bank competition. Hence, counterfactual values 
Table 4




Observed in the 
post-merger 
period
Counterfactual for the 
after-merger period
(1) (2) (3)
Credit ﬂ  ows (ln)
Total 5.76 5.81 5.93
Households 4.10 4.77 5.26 ***
Firms 5.59 6.01 4.36 ***
Interest rates
Total 11.46 8.20 9.53 ***
Households 13.31 9.37 11.08 ***
Firms 11.03 6.83 8.92 ***
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The estimations are performed for quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. The pre-merger period comprehends the 
1995-1999 period, whereas the post-merger period goes from 2000 to 2002. The interest rates refer to the new loans granted in 
each quarter. Column (3) presents the counterfactual estimates for the post-merger period, by taking into account the pre-merger 
equilibrium and the post-merger environment. Asterisks refer to mean comparison tests between the counterfactual and the ob-









for credit and interest rates are also estimated by assuming that the branch network remains unchanged 
at pre-merger levels. Furthermore, two different groups of ﬁ  nancial institutions are analyzed separately, 
more speciﬁ  cally the ones that are directly involved in the merger wave and those that are not directly 
involved in the merger wave. In addition, using the structural model we decompose the merger impacts 
into several different components, distinguishing between changes in the exogenous environment and 
changes in the branch network and market structure.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we estimate the impact of a large merger wave in the Portuguese banking system using two 
different methodologies. First we conduct a differential analysis of the impact of the merger wave, in line 
with what is usually done in the literature. However, this analytical tool suffers from several important 
limitations, as it ignores endogenous changes in market structure in the post-merger equilibrium in the 
banking system. Second, to overcome those limitations, we analyze the impact of this merger wave 
using a structural model of the credit market, described in Barros et al. (2010), which allows for the 
estimation of a counterfactual scenario. With this methodology, we are able to compare loans ﬂ  ows 
and interest rates observed after the mergers with those that would have been observed if the mergers 
had not taken place. 
Our main results show that the interest rates observed after the mergers were lower than what the coun-
terfactual would suggest. This may reﬂ  ect efﬁ  ciency and informational gains resulting from the mergers 
and reﬂ  ected into more competitive pricing. Furthermore, we ﬁ  nd important differences between loans 
granted to households and to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations: whereas loans granted to households were in 
fact lower than what would be suggested by the counterfactual, loans granted to ﬁ  rms actually recorded 
a stronger growth than what could have occurred if no mergers had taken place. All in all, households 
may have faced some constraints in access to credit after the merger, even though loans to households 
recorded robust growth rates during this period. On the contrary, loans granted to ﬁ  rms seem to have 
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